您现在的位置:首页 > 讲座

【2019-12-25 澳门娱乐美高梅网址学术论坛】Information, Incentives, and CEO Replacement

作者: | 发布日期:2019-12-11| 浏览次数:

讲座人:Xiaojing Meng(孟晓静)

 

讲座主题:Information, Incentives, and CEO Replacement

 

内容:This paper provides a new explanation for CEO turnover. In an environment in which all potential CEOs are endowed with the same ability and the firm is not looking for a strategy change, I demonstrate that CEO turnover may still occur in equilibrium. Specifically, a performance-contingent CEO replacement policy changes the reward structure of the departing CEO and thereby helps reduce excessive compensation earned by a CEO who stays on the job. At the same time, hiring a new CEO to implement the project also implies that the newly hired CEO will receive a limited liability rent. The trade-off between the benefit and cost of CEO replacement may lead firms to optimally commit to a more aggressive CEO replacement policy than the one that is ex-post efficient.

 

讲座时间:2019年12月25日,周三下午16:00

 

讲座地点:学院南路学术会堂604

 

讲座人简介:孟晓静,2001年毕业于澳门美高梅官网 2003年于北京大学光华管理学院取得会计学硕士学位, 2011年于哥伦比亚大学取得会计学博士学位。2011年加入纽约大学stern商学院,2018年晋升为副教授。美国会计协会、欧洲会计协会会员,曾多次参与国际会议,研究领域为corporate governancedebt contractingstrategic information transmission,研究成果发表于Journal of Accounting ResearchJournal of Financial EconomicsReview of Accounting Studies等期刊。